CSB’s deficient internal controls allowed quiet and unassuming controller, Sandy Jenkins, to embezzle nearly $17 million from his employer from 2004 to 2013. “The Fruitcake Fraud” (now the subject of a Discovery+ documentary) is an excellent case study for small businesses’ promotion of diligent auditing, and fraud prevention and deterrence programs. And this analysis of Jenkins’ crimes and his psyche could improve company controls. (See “New documentary recounts the Collin Street Bakery fraud scandal,” by Michael Fowler, KETK, Dec. 3, 2021.)

科林街面包店缺乏内部控制，让安静谦逊的财务总监桑迪·詹金斯从2004年到2013年从他的雇主那里挪用了近1700万美元。“水果蛋糕舞弊”（现在是Discovery+纪录片的主题）是小企业促进勤勉审计、舞弊预防和威慑计划的一个很好的案例研究。对詹金斯的罪行和他的心理的分析可以改善公司的控制。（请参阅Michael Fowler，KETK于2021年12月3日制作的《新纪实记述科林街面包店舞弊丑闻》）

According to Texas Monthly magazine, Jenkins first went to the dark side when he dipped into the bakery’s petty cash in December of 2004. After he got away with that, he tried his hand at a bigger scam when he had a credit card payment due after buying a new Lexus he couldn’t really afford. He typed a $20,000 check payable to CitiCard, and the software automatically signed the check “Bob McNutt,” president and CEO of CSB. Jenkins printed the check, voided it in the system and mailed it to CitiCard. He typed the next check payable to a legitimate bakery vendor but never mailed it and kept it, according to Texas Monthly. That voided the invoice in the system. Therefore, the books, at the very least, reconciled numerically. This is a type of “authorized maker scheme,” which fraudsters can perpetrate in organizations with poor controls or lax auditing. (See “Just Desserts,” by Katy Vine, Texas Monthly, January 2016, and “Ex-fruitcake executive sentenced for embezzling $17 million to fund life of lavish mansions, private jet vacations, Neiman Marcus shopping sprees and luxury cars,” Dailymail.com, updated Sept. 19, 2015.)

据《德州月刊》杂志报道，詹金斯在2004年12月涉足面包店的小额备用金时，第一次走向黑暗。在他逃脱惩罚后，他尝试了一个更大的骗局，因为他在购买了一辆他实际上负担不起的新雷克萨斯后，信用卡欠款到期。他打了一张20,000美元的支票给花旗银行，该软件自动在支票上签上了科林街面包店总裁兼首席执行官Bob McNutt的名字。詹金斯打印了支票，在系统中使其无效，并将其邮寄至花旗银行。根据《德州月刊》的资料，他输入了下一张应付一名合法面包店供应商的支票，但从未寄出并保存。这使系统中的发票无效。因此，至少这些金额在账上是一致的。这是一种“授权制作阴谋”，舞弊者可以在控制薄弱或审计松懈的组织中实施。（请参阅《Just Desserts》（2016年1月，德州月刊Katy Vine）和《Dailymail.com》（2015年9月19日更新），该网站分别载述了“Just Desserts”和“前任水果蛋糕执行官因挪用1,700万美元为豪华豪宅、私人飞机度假、内曼·马库斯奢侈品专卖店购物狂潮和豪华汽车的生活提供资金而被判刑的内容。）

Jenkins’ wild ride ended when Semetric Walker, then a CSB accountant for barely a year (but now the company’s controller), found a check to Capital One that she didn’t recognize because CSB didn’t have any accounts or credit cards with the financial institution, according to the Texas Monthly article. She then quickly found 11 discrepancies in the voided check register. She took the anomalies to executives. CSB fired Jenkins, the FBI moved in and Jenkins eventually was charged.

根据《德州月刊》的文章，詹金斯的疯狂旅行结束了，当时是科林街面包店会计师（但现在是该公司的财务主管）的Semetric Walker发现了一张她不认识的Capital One支票，因为科林街面包店在金融机构没有任何账户或信用卡。然后，她很快在无效的支票登记册中发现了11个差异。她把这些异常现象告知了高管。科林街面包店解雇了詹金斯，联邦调查局介入，詹金斯最终被起诉。

Jenkins fabricated 888 checks in his nine-year embezzlement spree. According to court documents, he and his wife, Kay, bought a luxurious second home in Santa Fe, N.M., purchased 38 luxury vehicles over the course of the scheme (he said he exchanged each car when it needed an oil change) and ran up more than $11 million on a Black American Express card alone. They spent $3.3 million on 223 trips on private jets to Santa Fe; Aspen, Colo.; and Napa, Calif., among other destinations. They eventually stopped shopping at Neiman Marcus, after spending about $1.2 million, when the store ran out of merchandise to sell them.

詹金斯在长达九年的挪用公款狂潮中伪造了888张支票。根据法庭文件，他和妻子凯在新墨西哥州圣达菲市购买了一套豪华的第二套住房，并在整个计划过程中购买了38辆豪华汽车（他说他在每辆车需要换油时都会换一辆车），仅用一张黑色美国运通卡就赚了1100多万美元。他们花了330万美元乘坐私人飞机前往圣达菲、科罗拉多州阿斯彭和加州纳帕以及其他目的地，共223次。他们最终停止在Neiman Marcus（内曼·马库斯奢侈品专卖店）购物，花了大约120万美元，把专卖店的商品都买光了。

On Sept. 16, 2015, Sandy Jenkins, then 66, was sentenced to 120 months in federal prison after he pleaded guilty to mail fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering and making a false statement to a financial institution. Kay Jenkins pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering and was sentenced to five years of probation. She moved to a different city. Sandy Jenkins died in prison on March 15, 2019, when he took his own life. (See “Former Collin Street Bakery Executive and Wife Sentenced,” U.S. Department of Justice, Sept. 16, 2015; “Tarrant County Medical Examiner: Jenkins dies in hospital,” by Sarah Allen, Corsicana Daily Sun, March 21, 2019; and “A New Documentary Slices Up the Corsicana Fruitcake Scandal,” by Todd Jorgenson, D Magazine, Dec. 1, 2021.)

2015年9月16日，时年66岁的桑迪·詹金斯因承认邮件舞弊、共谋洗钱和向金融机构做出虚假陈述而被判处120个月的联邦监禁。凯·詹金斯承认犯有共谋洗钱罪，并被判处五年缓刑。她搬到了另一个城市。桑迪·詹金斯于2019年3月15日在狱中去世，他自杀了。（见美国司法部，2015年9月16日，「前科林街面包店行政人员及妻子被判刑」；2019年3月21日，科西嘉每日太阳报，Sarah Allen，「Tarrant County Medical Examiner:詹金斯在医院去世」；2021年12月1日，D Magazine，Todd Jorgenson，「一部新纪实片讲述科西嘉水果蛋糕丑闻」）

How did CSB miss the red flags during Jenkins’ nine-year-scheme? As controller, he had the final say on all bookkeeping and financial obligations. And his department lacked segregation of duties. He could create invoices and reconcile statements with no second-set-of-eyes oversight. Since then, company executives say they’ve learned their lesson and now conduct regular internal audits to ensure the accuracy of their records, while also encouraging interdepartmental communication. (See “The Sandy Jenkins Embezzlement Scandal,” Collins Street Bakery Blog, March 7, 2022, and the Dailymail.com article above.)

科林街面包店在詹金斯的九年计划中是如何错过危险信号的？作为财务总监，他对所有账目和财务义务拥有最终决定权。他的部门缺乏职责分离、他可以在没有第二人监督的情况下开具发票并核对对账单。自此，公司管理人员表示，他们已经吸取了教训，现在定期进行内部审计，以确保记录的准确性，同时鼓励部门间的沟通。（请参阅「桑迪詹金斯盗用公款丑闻」、Collins Street Bakery Blog，2022年3月7日及Dailymail.com以上的文章）

The ACFE’s Fraud Examiners Manual says that organizations should always verify lists of voided checks against physical copies and review bank statements to ensure that voided checks haven’t been processed. (See Fraud Examiners Manual, Section 1/Payment Tampering Schemes/Check Tampering Red Flags.)

ACFE的《舞弊审查师手册》指出，各企业应始终对照实物副本核实作废支票清单，并审查银行对账单，以确保未处理作废支票。（请参阅《舞弊审查师手册》第1节/付款篡改阴谋/支票篡改危险信号）

Furthermore, the lack of an independent auditor or regular reviews and reconciliations of bank statements are obvious red flags. Not reconciling bank statements allows unauthorized checks to go undetected. And the fraud is testament to why an organization can’t simply trust without vigorous auditing. “A lot of people, they like to think it would never happen to them, that they would not have been caught off guard like we were,” says Helen Crawford, CSB’s vice president of public relations and customer service and partner at the bakery. “And I contend it will always happen that way. It’s the trust that allows them to come in and embezzle.” (See “Documentary Tells Story of Fraud at North Texas Fruitcake Bakery,” by Deborah Ferguson, 5 NBCDFW, Dec. 1, 2021.)

此外，缺乏独立审计师或定期审查和核对银行对账单是明显的危险信号。不核对银行对账单会使未经授权的支票不被发现。本文中的舞弊证明了为什么一个组织不能在没有严格审计的情况下简单地信任员工。科林街面包店负责公共关系和客户服务的副总裁兼面包店合伙人海伦•克劳福德（Helen Crawford）表示：「很多人，他们都认为这不会发生在他们身上，他们不会像我们一样提防不住。」。“我认为这种情况永远都会发生。是信任让他们进入并盗用资金”（请参阅底波拉Ferguson的《讲述德克萨斯州北部水果蛋糕店舞弊事件的纪实片》，5 NBCDFW，2021年12月1日）

Before Jenkins began stealing money from his employer, he was described as reliable and was never late to a meeting or paying corporate taxes. He worked his way up the corporate ladder, and by 2000 he made a good salary. But he felt unnoticed at work and in the cliquish Corsicana. His wife said the bakery wasn’t paying him enough. That’s when he began his company-check scheme. (See “Fruitcake & Crime Spice Up a Small Texas Town in documentary with local ties,” Fort Worth Business Press, Nov. 27, 2021.)

在詹金斯开始从雇主那里偷钱之前，他被描述为可靠的人，并且从未在一次会议或缴纳企业税时延误。他在公司阶梯上一路向上，到2000年，他赚了一份不错的薪水。但他在工作和公司中感到毫无存在感，而且他的妻子说面包店付给他的钱不够。就在那时，他开始了他的公司支票阴谋。（请参阅《水果饼与犯罪与地方联系在记录片中为德克萨斯州的一个小镇增添情趣》，Fort Worth Business Press，2021年11月27日）

Classically, as we see in most large frauds, Jenkins began small but became dependent on the luxurious living. And a former classmate said that Jenkins might have inherited a penchant for extravagance and entitlement from his mother. While the debate of nature versus nurture is ongoing, parents’ traits can affect their offspring. Celia Aniskovich, the director-producer of the new TV documentary, “Fruitcake Fraud,” says that Jenkins was needy, wanted to impress and sought approval from others. (See “Just Desserts,” by Katy Vine, Texas Monthly, and “Taking the cake: New TV doc tracks the great Texas fruitcake embezzlement case,” by Jerome Weeks and Jill Ament, Texas Standard, Dec. 2, 2021.)

传统上，正如我们在大多数大型舞弊中看到的那样，詹金斯开始时规模很小，但却开始依赖奢华的生活。一位前同学说，詹金斯可能从母亲那里继承了对奢侈和权利的偏爱。尽管有关先天与后天的讨论仍在进行中，但父母的性格特征会影响他们的子女。新电视纪录片《水果蛋糕舞弊》的导演兼制片人西莉亚•安尼科维奇表示，詹金斯有需要，希望给人留下深刻印象，并寻求他人的认可。（请参阅《Just Desserts》（德克萨斯月刊凯蒂•维恩著）和《Taking the cake:New TV doc tracks the great德克萨斯fruitcake Emergement case》（杰罗姆Weeks and Jill Ament，德克萨斯Standard，2021年12月2日著）

Aspects of Sandy Jenkins’ persona allowed his concealment and deceit to flourish. Both Jenkins and his wife were sociable and involved in the community, so it came as a big surprise when they were discovered embezzling from the company. Many questioned Jenkins about the sources of his income. He’d variously say a wealthy uncle, a trust fund lawsuit victory or an inheritance of expensive watches. As with many long-term fraudsters, he was a convincing liar. (See NBCDFW, Texas Standard and Dailymail.com articles above.)

桑迪•詹金斯的个人形象让他的隐瞒和欺骗行为更加猖獗。詹金斯和他的妻子都很善于交际，都参与了社区活动，所以当他们被发现从公司挪用公款时，让人很意外。许多人向詹金斯询问他的收入来源。他会说自己有一个有钱的叔叔给他留了很多遗产，比如信托基金的诉讼胜利或昂贵手表的遗产。与许多长期舞弊者一样，他是一个令人信服的骗人者。（请参阅上文NBCDFW，Texas Standard和 Dailymail.com 文章）

CSB prides itself on being a “close-knit family.” So many companies make the mistake of not placing guardrails around their employees because they believe they’re “brothers and sisters” who could never betray their “relatives.” However, organizations aren’t families. They’re groups of disparate people, honest and dishonest, who can quickly and boldly break loyalties if tempted beyond their resistance to breaking the law.

科林街面包店以成为一个“紧密联系的家庭”而自豪。许多公司犯了不给员工设置护栏的错误，因为他们认为自己是“兄弟姐妹”，永远不会背叛他们的“亲戚”。但是，组织不是家庭。他们是一群不同的人，诚实和不诚实，如果受到诱惑，他们可能会被诱惑去违法，迅速而大胆地打破忠诚。

Apparently, Jenkins didn’t intend to steal when he first began his job. But pre-employment personality screening might have spotted some early red flags that could’ve have indicated risks for the bakery. [See “8 Top Personality Tests Used in Psychology (and by Employers),” by editorial team, Indeed, June 30, 2021.]

显然，詹金斯在第一次开始工作时并不打算偷窃。但就业前性格筛查可能已经发现了一些早期的危险信号，这些危险信号可能表明了面包店的风险。[请参阅编辑团队于2021年6月30日发布的《心理学（及雇主）使用的8项最重要的人格测试》]

Despite Jenkins’ fraud, Collin Street Bakery is still going strong but not without major changes. “We’ve put into place all the accounting mechanisms that will safeguard you against this kind of thing in the future. We just never had a need to in the past and so, we weren’t even cognizant that was an Achilles’ heel of ours,” says Crawford, CSB’s vice president of public relations and customer service.

尽管有詹金斯的舞弊行为，科林街面包店仍然很强大，但并非没有重大变化。“我们已经建立了所有会计机制，这些机制将保护你在未来免受此类事件的影响。我们过去从来没有需要过，所以，我们甚至没有意识到这是我们的致命弱点，“科林街面包店公共关系和客户服务副总裁克劳福德说。

The case’s lead prosecutor, Nick Bunch, says that “companies … need to establish procedures to have multiple eyes on their bank accounts and to ensure that one person is not left with sole authority to cut checks. Companies need to periodically review their accounting practices and have a game plan in place to quickly report a fraud when detected — and to preserve assets.” (See NBCDFW article above.)

该案的首席检察官尼克·邦奇说，“公司……需要制定程序，对其银行账户进行多重监控，并确保没有一个人有唯一的权力来签署支票。公司需要定期审查其会计实操，并制定一项游戏计划，以便在发现舞弊时快速报告舞弊行为，并保护资产。（见上文NBCDFW的文章）

Savvy organizations hold frequent trainings that, among other topics, plainly describe punishments for those who give into temptations. Emphasizing employees’ personal costs can deter their illegal actions. Appealing to their loyalty to the organizational family seldom works.

精明的组织经常举办培训，其中包括清晰地描述对试探者的惩罚。强调员工的个人成本可以阻止他们的非法行为，吸引他们对组织家族忠诚很少奏效。

Small businesses remain particularly vulnerable to preventable and detectable frauds because they often trust their employees too much. So, they must have strong internal audit departments, preferably staffed with CFEs, and reputable external auditors. And CFEs often can spot troubling employee personalities, traits, behaviors, intrinsic and extrinsic motivators, and patterns long before fraud schemes erupt. Organizations can use observed patterns to form tactics to deter employees from committing fraud.

小企业仍然特别容易受到可预防和可检测的舞弊行为的影响，因为它们往往过于信任员工。因此，他们必须拥有强大的内部审计部门，最好配备CFE，以及信誉良好的外部审计师。CFE通常可以在舞弊阴谋爆发之前很久就发现令人不安的员工个性、特征、行为、内在和外在动机以及模式。组织可以使用观察到的模式来形成策略，以阻止员工进行舞弊。

CSB reclaimed only about $5 million. That extra $12 million loss is a sorry lesson, and, hopefully, a strong incentive to prevent future debacles. May your organization learn from this fruitcake company’s shocking betrayal, heartbreak and enormous financial costs.

科林街面包店最终只追回了大约500万美元，另外的1200万美元损失是一个令人遗憾的教训，希望这是防止未来崩溃的强大动力。愿您的组织从这家水果蛋糕公司令人震惊的背叛、心碎和巨大的财务成本中吸取教训。